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Abstract
Objective: We examined the effects of control motivation on in-group positivity.
Past research suggests that people compensate for low personal control by increasing
support for social in-groups. We predicted that the effect of personal control on in-
group positivity would depend on the type of in-group positivity. Low personal con-
trol should increase compensatory, narcissistic in-group positivity, whereas high
personal control should increase secure, non-narcissistic in-group positivity.
Method: These hypotheses were tested in a cross-sectional survey (Study 1 N5 1,083,
54% female, Mage5 47.68), two experiments (Study 2 N5 105, 50% female,
Mage5 32.05; Study 3 N5 154, 40% female, Mage5 29.93), and a longitudinal
survey (Study 4 N5 398, 51% female, Mage5 32.05).
Results: In all studies, personal control was negatively associated with narcissistic
in-group positivity but positively associated with non-narcissistic in-group positivity.
The longitudinal survey additionally showed that the positive relationship between
personal control and non-narcissistic in-group positivity was reciprocal. Moreover,
both types of in-group positivity differentially mediated between personal control and
out-group attitudes: Narcissistic in-group positivity predicted negative attitudes, and
non-narcissistic positivity predicted positive attitudes.
Conclusions: These findings highlight the role of individual motivation in fostering
different types of in-group positivity and intergroup outcomes.
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Group narcissism . . . is extremely important as an ele-
ment giving satisfaction to the members of the group
and particularly to those who have few other reasons
to feel proud and worthwhile. (Fromm, 1973, p. 275)
1 | INTRODUCTION
The opening quote from Erich Fromm (1973) reflects a tradi-
tion in psychology to link deficits in the personal realm of
the self with compensations in the social realm of the self.
Indeed, previous research confirms that social groups satisfy
various individual needs and motives (e.g., Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; Mullin & Hogg, 1998; Vignoles, Regalia,
Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). In the current research,
we focus on the need for personal control, or the ability to
influence the course of one’s life, which is one of the basic
human motivations (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kay, Whitson,
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009).1 Although in-group positivity
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can increase because groups help manage individual needs,
including the need for personal control, it may also increase
because groups offer opportunities for self-fulfillment to
those who feel in control. We argue that the deprivation
of personal control should foster defensive and destructive
in-group positivity, whereas increased personal control has
the potential to facilitate more secure and constructive com-
mitment to the in-group. In the current research, we seek to
demonstrate these relationships by relying on the distinction
between narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity.
Collective narcissism, a belief in the in-group’s unparal-
leled greatness that is contingent on external recognition, is a
predictor of destructive intergroup attitudes (Golec de Zavala,
Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). It has been pre-
viously theorized, yet demonstrated only indirectly, that the
negative consequences of collective narcissism result from its
defensive character (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-
Golec, 2013). We aim to demonstrate that such defensiveness
stems from the fact that collective narcissism compensates for
frustration of basic needs, such as the need for personal con-
trol. In fact, it has been suggested that decreased personal con-
trol was an important factor behind the rise of nationalistic
sentiments that brought the Nazi regime to power (Frey &
Rez, 2002). This is in line with Fromm’s (1973) notion of a
compensatory function of collective narcissism (see also
Adorno, 1963/1998).
Non-narcissistic in-group positivity—positive in-group
identification that is independent of the recognition of the
group by others—is related to positive out-group attitudes
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). We aim to
demonstrate that this type of in-group positivity is a result of
increased personal control, indicating that one can realize
individual potential by supporting the group rather than by
using the group to satisfy personal needs. For example, it has
been argued that the Solidarity movement in Communist
Poland was inspired by increased feelings of subjectivity fos-
tered by the teachings of Pope John Paul II (Balcerczyk,
2014). This would suggest that reliance on the social group
that led peaceful system change did not result from the
authoritarian regime’s limiting personal control but rather
from a restoration of individual control and autonomy. Over-
all, by examining different motivational underpinnings of dif-
ferent types of in-group positivity, we seek to shed light on
the relationship between the self and the group. Our approach
allows us to go beyond a mere description of different types
of in-group positivity by showing why some forms of in-
group support promote hostility while others have the poten-
tial to facilitate tolerance (see, e.g., Brewer, 1999).
1.1 | Social groups and control restoration
Feelings of personal control are linked to psychological well-
being (Skinner, 1996; Taylor, 1983). Deprivation of personal
control triggers immediate attempts to restore it. This can be
accomplished by upholding convictions (e.g., superstitions;
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) or supporting entities (e.g., inter-
ventionist governments; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, &
Laurin, 2008) that restore a sense of control. Deprivation of
personal control should also lead people to “define their self
via the in-group and act as an in-group member[s] because
this might maintain perceptions of power and control exerted
through the (social) self” (Fritsche et al., 2013, p. 20).
Research indicates that low personal control fosters in-group
favoritism (Fritsche et al., 2013), in-group defense manifest
by derogating critics of the in-group (Agroskin & Jonas,
2013, Studies 1 and 3), and ethnocentrism (Agroskin &
Jonas, 2013, Study 3). Moreover, low personal control
accounts for the effects of mortality salience on in-group
defense. Death reminders increase in-group worldview
defense more strongly when death is portrayed as uncontrol-
lable (vs. self-inflicted; Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008).
Personal control also moderates the relationship between
threat and out-group attitudes. Threat predicts out-group hos-
tility only when individuals perceive they have no personal
control over the threat (Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones,
2014; cf. Aydin, Krueger, Frey, Kastenm€ueller, & Fischer,
2014). Overall, research to date suggests that low personal
control leads to in-group bias and out-group derogation.
Theoretical accounts that explain the above findings pos-
tulate that the deprivation of personal control plays a role in
shaping intergroup attitudes because it is restored by endorse-
ment of group membership (Fritsche et al., 2013). However,
the empirical evidence shows that low personal control
increases in-group preference relative to other groups, rather
than in-group identification. In previous studies, deprivation
of personal control produced intergroup bias, which mani-
fested in higher in-group versus out-group ratings (Fritsche
et al., 2008, Study 2; Fritsche et al., 2013, Studies 2 and 3) or
in lower ratings of the out-group alone (Fritsche et al., 2013,
Study 4). The same studies also assessed in-group identifica-
tion in terms of feeling connected to the in-group and the
importance of social identity to the self, but changes in perso-
nal control did not affect responses to these items. To our
knowledge, a direct link between personal control and the
strength of in-group identification has only been shown in
two studies: In one, perceived low control over one’s mortal-
ity increased in-group identification (Fritsche et al., 2008,
Study 3); in another, low personal control increased identifi-
cation with task groups but not with other groups, such as
nations (Stollberg, Fritsche, & Bäcker, 2015, Study 1).
In light of the ample evidence indicating that low perso-
nal control is associated with intergroup bias, the relatively
weaker empirical support for a direct link between low per-
sonal control and in-group identification is striking. It is
unlikely that deprivation of personal control affects in-
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group protection, intergroup bias, or out-group derogation
without increasing in-group positivity. We propose that the
relationship between personal control and positive in-
group identification might be difficult to observe because
personal control may have opposite relationships with dif-
ferent forms of in-group positivity. The existence of two
interrelated but qualitatively distinct forms of in-group pos-
itivity is arguably best demonstrated by the example of
national identity.
1.2 | Different forms of in-group positivity
Psychological literature differentiates between two types of
national sentiments: patriotism, or love for one’s nation and
pride in one’s nationality; and nationalism, or an orientation
toward national supremacy (Druckman, 1994; Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989). Nationalism predicts prejudice and inter-
group aggressiveness, whereas patriotism shows less robust
links to negative intergroup attitudes and is sometimes linked
to intergroup tolerance (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003; De
Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown,
2001). Nationalism is predicted by a non-self-determined
motivation for in-group identification, whereas patriotism is
predicted by a self-determined motivation for in-group iden-
tification (Amiot & Aubin, 2013). This means that patriotism
reflects an intrinsic motivation to positively identify with a
national group, which is associated with greater subjective
well-being. Nationalism, in contrast, is compensatory, results
from external motivations and social pressures, and is related
to lower levels of well-being and negative intergroup atti-
tudes (Yampolsky & Amiot, 2013). In a similar vein,
researchers differentiate secure and insecure in-group attach-
ment (Jackson & Smith, 1999), constructive and blind patri-
otism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999), and national
attachment and glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan,
2006). All of these accounts propose that one aspect of in-
group positivity is somehow problematic, is compensatory,
and predicts out-group hostility. Yet, they do not provide a
sound and testable explanation for why such in-group posi-
tivity exists and what functions it serves.
We propose to address this gap by investigating the moti-
vations underlying different types of in-group positivity. To
this end, we incorporate a conceptualization that goes beyond
national sentiments and differentiates between narcissistic and
non-narcissistic in-group positivity (Golec de Zavala,
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). This distinction is inspired by
research on self-evaluation where personal self-esteem (i.e., a
realistic pride people take in their strengths; e.g., Kernis,
2005) is differentiated from narcissism (i.e., an inflated view
of oneself that requires continual external validation; e.g.,
Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Self-esteem pre-
dicts emotional stability and well-being, whereas narcissism
is related to less optimal psychological functioning (e.g., Ker-
nis, 2005; Stronge, Cichocka, & Sibley, 2016). Adjusting for
the variance shared between self-esteem and narcissism
reveals that narcissism alone predicts antisocial behavior, pre-
sumably because narcissists’ need to proclaim their superior-
ity is linked to sensitivity to threats or criticism. High non-
narcissistic self-esteem (i.e., unassuming pride in the self
without the narcissistic need for validation) is more resilient
to threats and, thus, predicts less antisocial behavior (Locke,
2009; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004).
Recent research proposes that a similar process can be
observed in the relationship between out-group attitudes and
narcissistic versus non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Col-
lective narcissism, an inflated view of the in-group that needs
external validation, predicts increased sensitivity to criticism
and lack of recognition from others, presumably due to an
underlying need to proclaim the in-group’s worth (Golec de
Zavala et al., 2009). Consequently, it is a robust predictor of
out-group hostility, particularly when the in-group’s image is
threatened (Cai & Gries, 2013; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka,
2012; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013;
Lyons, Coursey, & Kenworthy, 2013). Similar to approaches
distinguishing non-narcissistic self-esteem, one way to distin-
guish non-narcissistic in-group positivity is to partial out col-
lective narcissism from measures of in-group identification.
Although in-group identification consists of multiple compo-
nents (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004;
Leach et al., 2008), a popular approach sees it as a combina-
tion of feeling like a member of an in-group, satisfaction with
this in-group membership, and solidarity with and connection
to other in-group members (Cameron, 2004; Postmes, Has-
lam, & Jans, 2012; Tajfel, 1978). In-group identification tends
to be positively correlated with collective narcissism, as both
constructs assume a positive evaluation of the in-group. How-
ever, accounting for their shared variance helps distinguish
their unique effects.
Covarying out collective narcissism from in-group identi-
fication removes the compensatory need to externally vali-
date the in-group’s image. What remains is secure, non-
narcissistic in-group positivity that can be interpreted as an
unassuming, positive emotional investment in one’s in-group
that is independent of the recognition of the group by others
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). We refer to
in-group identification without the variance shared with col-
lective narcissism as non-narcissistic in-group positivity.
When the positive in-group identification is partialed out of
collective narcissism, what remains is the concern about
external recognition of the in-group’s worth. We refer to col-
lective narcissism without the variance shared with in-group
identification as narcissistic in-group positivity. Narcissistic
and non-narcissistic in-group positivity have opposed rela-
tionships with out-group attitudes. When the variance shared
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by collective narcissism and in-group identification is
covaried out, narcissistic in-group positivity predicts out-
group hostility, whereas non-narcissistic in-group positivity
predicts favorable attitudes toward out-groups, presumably
because it lacks the need for external validation and is,
thus, resilient to intergroup threats (Cichocka, Golec de
Zavala, Marchlewska, & Olechowski, 2015; Cichocka,
Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016; Golec
de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Uncovering the
individual motivations that underlie narcissistic and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity would help explain these
opposing relationships.
1.3 | Personal control and narcissistic versus
non-narcissistic in-group positivity
We propose that narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group
positivity should change as a function of changes to personal
control. Indirectly supporting this prediction are findings
linking the more destructive forms of in-group positivity to
decreased self-determination and worse psychological func-
tioning, and the less destructive forms of in-group positivity
to emotional stability and greater psychological well-being
(Amiot & Aubin, 2013). These suggest that low personal
control may be compensated by higher narcissistic in-group
positivity, whereas high personal control may predict higher
non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Empirical evidence sup-
porting the group-based control restoration model (Fritsche
et al., 2008, 2013) further points to the link between personal
control deprivation and narcissistic in-group positivity. Low
personal control has been linked to in-group favoritism and
out-group hostility (Agroskin & Jonas, 2013; Greenaway
et al., 2014), which are robustly associated with narcissistic
in-group positivity. Thus, we expect narcissistic in-group
positivity to mediate between low personal control and nega-
tive out-group attitudes.
The link between increased personal control and in-
group positivity might have been less studied because in
light of existing social-psychological theories, it just seems
less obvious. However, indirect evidence suggests that high
personal control could reinforce commitment to the in-group.
In classic personality theorizing, Erikson (1968) argued that
engaging with one’s community is an important motivation
at higher levels of psychosocial development: Those with a
mature and stable self are able to take responsibility for
others and act on their behalf. Recent empirical evidence
demonstrates that the individual self can be functional for
reinforcing in-group positivity specifically. For example,
individuals with a stable self-concept show higher in-group
identification due to their tendency to attribute their own
characteristics to the in-group (Van Veelen, Otten, & Han-
sen, 2011). Moreover, Jans, Postmes, and Van der Zee
(2012) demonstrated that, at least in heterogeneous groups,
in-group identification can be built on expressions of individ-
uality and compatibility, rather than similarity with other
group members. These routes for social identity formation
presume that the sense of in-group identity is strengthened
and enriched by contributions from individual members. We
propose that such processes should be facilitated when indi-
vidual needs are satisfied (rather than frustrated).
People may be especially likely and willing to show in-
group positivity when they experience high personal control.
Support for this prediction can be derived from self-
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1987, 2000), which pro-
poses that satisfaction of the basic human need for autonomy
(i.e., experiencing one’s behavior as self-determined, rather
than externally controlled) is crucial in facilitating the
expression of individual intrinsic motivation. This includes
enhanced performance (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci,
2001) and pro-social behaviors (Gagne, 2003), as well as
greater in-group attachment (Gagne & Deci, 2005).
Further, research shows that people who feel self-
sufficient are more likely to feel that they can enhance their
in-group’s welfare (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). Taken
together, this evidence suggests that satisfaction of individual
needs may promote constructive commitment to the in-
group. We then propose a novel hypothesis that increased
personal control will foster non-narcissistic in-group positiv-
ity, devoid of the need to validate the in-group image by der-
ogating out-groups. Integrating this approach with our
reasoning about narcissistic in-group positivity’s compensat-
ing low personal control leads to the prediction that a
decrease as well as an increase in personal control may
enhance in-group positivity—just in-group positivity of a dif-
ferent kind.
1.4 | Overview of the current research
In four studies, we test the hypothesis that personal control
will have opposite effects on narcissistic and non-narcissistic
in-group positivity. Increases in in-group support after loss
of control reflect a compensatory process, which serves a
self-protective function. Hence, low personal control should
be associated with narcissistic in-group positivity, and defen-
siveness in intergroup relations. Increased personal control,
on the other hand, is likely to allow for investing the self in
the in-group. Having personal control should then foster
non-narcissistic in-group positivity, which is linked to more
positive intergroup attitudes.
We seek to shed light on why previous research has
failed to find a reliable link between personal control and in-
group identification (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2008, 2013). We
propose that in order to better observe this link, collective
narcissism and in-group identification need to be assessed in
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the same study. We expect the opposed effects of personal
control to be especially pronounced when we adjust for their
overlap, revealing the effects for narcissistic versus non-
narcissistic in-group positivity. Therefore, we first report
effects of personal control on collective narcissism and in-
group identification separately. Next, we report the effects of
personal control on each form of in-group positivity while
controlling for the other form by including it in the analyses
as a covariate. We investigate these effects in a cross-
sectional survey (Study 1), two experiments (Studies 2 and
3), and a longitudinal survey (Study 4), in which we examine
the reciprocal paths between personal control, both forms of
in-group positivity, and out-group attitudes. In all studies, we
conceptualize in-group identification as a combination of in-
group centrality, solidarity, and satisfaction (Cameron, 2004).
These aspects of in-group identification are highly correlated
and form a homogenous conceptualization of “the Tajfelian
definition of identification” (Postmes et al., 2012, p. 9).
2 | STUDY 1
Study 1 tested the prediction that personal control would
have opposite relationships with narcissistic and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity: Low personal control should
be associated with collective narcissism, whereas high perso-
nal control should be associated with in-group identification.
We expected these effects to be especially pronounced once
the overlap between collective narcissism and in-group identi-
fication is accounted for, that is, when we observe the effects
for narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity.
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants and procedure
We analyzed data from a large Polish nationally representa-
tive survey that measured personal control, national collec-
tive narcissism, and national in-group identification (among
other variables). The initial sample consisted of 1,115
respondents, but we excluded data from 32 participants who
reported their identity as other than Polish. The final sample
consisted of 1,083 participants (584 women), ages 18–88
(M5 47.68, SD5 18.04). Data were collected by the Public
Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) as computer-assisted face-




Identification with the national in-group was measured with
the Social Identification Scale (Cameron, 2004), which
includes 12 items capturing in-group ties (“I have a lot in
common with other Poles”), centrality (“In general, being
Polish is an important part of my self-image”), and in-group
affect (“In general, I’m glad to be Polish”). Participants
responded using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree; a5 .77; M5 3.81, SD5 0.63).
Collective narcissism
Collective narcissism was measured with a five-item version
of the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala,
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) used with respect to the
national in-group (e.g., “The Polish nation deserves special
treatment”). Participants responded using a scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree; a5 .80;
M5 3.68, SD5 1.22).
Personal control
Personal control was measured with four items: (a) “I feel I
have little control over my life” versus “I feel I have great
control over my life,” (b) “I have little influence on my fate”
versus “I have great influence on my fate,” (c) “There are
many things in my life I cannot influence” versus “There are
few things in my life I cannot influence,” and (d) “Things
that are happening in my life are simply a matter of coinci-
dence” versus “Things that are happening in my life are not
a coincidence.” Participants responded using a scale ranging
from –3 (greater agreement with a low-control item) to1 3
(greater agreement with a high-control item). Responses
were recoded into a 1–7 scale, with higher scores indicating
higher control (a5 .68; M5 4.96, SD5 1.32).
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Unadjusted analyses
Collective narcissism and in-group identification were signif-
icantly positively correlated, r(1070)5 .30, p< .001. In line
with our predictions, personal control was significantly nega-
tively correlated with collective narcissism, r(1068)5 –.10,
p5 .002, and significantly positively correlated with in-
group identification, r(1070)5 .18, p< .001.
2.2.2 | Analyses adjusting for the other type
of in-group positivity
Next, we examined the effects of personal control on collec-
tive narcissism and in-group identification, each time adjust-
ing for the other type of in-group positivity. In the first
regression analysis, we included personal control as the pre-
dictor, in-group identification as the covariate, and collective
narcissism as the outcome variable (i.e., testing the effect on
narcissistic in-group positivity). The negative effect of
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personal control on narcissistic in-group positivity was sig-
nificant, B5 –0.14, SE5 0.03, b5 –.16, p< .001; whole
model F(2, 1067)5 68.94, p< .001, R25 .11. We conducted
a similar regression analysis for in-group identification as the
outcome variable, with personal control as the predictor and
collective narcissism as the covariate (i.e., testing the effect
on non-narcissistic in-group positivity). The positive effect
of personal control on non-narcissistic in-group positivity
was significant, B5 0.10, SE5 0.01, b5 .21, p< .001;
whole model F(2, 1067)5 82.80, p< .001, R25 .13. These
effects remained significant when we adjusted for age, gen-
der, and education.
2.3 | Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, collective narcissism was associ-
ated with lower personal control, and this association was
even more pronounced when we adjusted for in-group identi-
fication. In-group identification was associated with higher
personal control, and this effect was even more pronounced
when we adjusted for collective narcissism. Although Study
1 provides a first encouraging test of our model of the oppos-
ing effects of personal control on different forms of in-group
positivity, it did not allow for determining causal relation-
ships between variables. Therefore, in Studies 2 and 3, we
used an experimental design.
3 | STUDY 2
In Study 2, we examined the effects of experimentally
manipulated personal control on collective narcissism and in-
group identification. We expected the effects to be especially
pronounced when the relationship between these two varia-
bles is accounted for, and we predicted that a decrease in per-
sonal control would result in an increase in narcissistic in-
group positivity, whereas an increase in personal control
would result in an increase in non-narcissistic in-group
positivity.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants and procedure
Study 2 was conducted among 111 participants recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. At the beginning of the study,
participants indicated their national identity: 107 participants
reported being American, and four participants indicated
other nationalities. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the only two experimental conditions. We manipu-
lated control with the procedure used by Whitson and Galin-
sky (2008, Study 4). Participants were asked to recall a
particular incident in which something threatening happened
to them and they did versus did not have control over the sit-
uation. This procedure holds the valence of the described
events constant and negative while manipulating personal
control. One person commented that he or she could not
recall such an incident and was excluded from the analyses.
Because there is evidence that the effects of self-threats tend
to be more pronounced after delays (Fritsche et al., 2013;
Jonas et al., 2014), before measuring collective narcissism
and in-group identification, we added a neutral filler task con-
sisting of reading a neutral excerpt from a novel and answer-
ing two questions about it (based on Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka,
Orehek, & Abdollahi, 2012). Finally, participants completed
measures of collective narcissism and in-group identification.
Based on their response to the question about nationality, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how much they agree with
each statement in relation to the group of Americans or their
(other) national group. The order of scale presentation was
randomized and did not moderate the effects.
The study also included an attention check. Participants
were asked about the content of the filler task. Four partici-
pants who failed the attention check were excluded from the
analyses. We also excluded one person with extremely long
completion time (over 4 hours; other completion time-
s> 2min and <17min). The final sample included 105 par-
ticipants (52 men, 52 women, 1 missing), ages 18–81 (M5
32.05, SD5 11.79; 1 missing); most (n5 76) were White
(not Hispanic). There were 56 participants in the low-control
condition and 49 in the high-control condition.
3.1.2 | Measures
In-group identification
In-group identification was measured as in Study 1 (a5 .89;
M5 3.45, SD5 0.74), with respect to the national in-group
(Americans or other).
Collective narcissism
Collective narcissism was measured as in Study 1 (a5 .86;
M5 2.43, SD5 1.14), with respect to the national in-group
(Americans or other).
3.2 | Results
3.2.1 | Unadjusted analyses
Collective narcissism was significantly correlated with in-
group identification, r(103)5 .50, p< .001. Without covari-
ates, the effects of personal control on collective narcissism,
F(1, 103)5 2.53, p5 .11, h2p5 .02 (low control: M5 2.60,
SD5 1.14; high control: M5 2.24, SD5 1.12) and on in-
group identification, F(1, 103)5 1.24, p5 .27, h2p5 .01
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(low control: M5 3.38, SD5 0.74; high control: M5 3.54,
SD5 0.72), were not significant.
3.2.2 | Analyses adjusting for the other type
of in-group positivity
We conducted analyses of covariance with the experimental
manipulation as the independent variable, collective narcis-
sism and in-group identification as dependent variables, and
the other type of in-group positivity as the covariate. When
we adjusted for in-group identification, we found a signifi-
cant effect of personal control on narcissistic in-group posi-
tivity, F(1, 102)5 6.42, p5 .01, h2p5 .06. Narcissistic in-
group positivity was higher in the low-control condition
(Madj5 2.66, SE5 0.13) than in the high-control condition
(Madj5 2.18, SE5 0.14). When we adjusted for collective
narcissism, we found a significant effect of personal control
on non-narcissistic in-group positivity, F(1, 102)5 5.09,
p5 .03, h2p5 .05. Non-narcissistic in-group positivity was
higher in the high-control condition (Madj5 3.60, SE5 0.09)
than in the low-control condition (Madj5 3.32, SE5 0.08).
These results remained significant when we did not exclude
any participants, as well as when we adjusted for age, gen-
der, ethnicity, and education.
3.3 | Discussion
In Study 2, low personal control increased narcissistic in-
group positivity, whereas high personal control increased
non-narcissistic in-group positivity. However, these effects
were found only when the common variance of the two types
of in-group positivity was accounted for. This suggests that
not distinguishing narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group
positivity might conceal the complex nature of the relation-
ship between control motivation and in-group positivity. The
results of Study 2 allow us to further understand the nature
of narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Nar-
cissistic in-group positivity seems to reflect a defensive com-
pensation for personal control deprivation. The fact that non-
narcissistic in-group positivity was strengthened by an
increase in personal control indicates that it can be consid-
ered a non-compensatory form of in-group positivity.
4 | STUDY 3
Study 2 examined the effects of personal control in the con-
text of threatening situations. Research on compensatory
control suggests that these effects should be generalizable
beyond the context of threat (Kay et al., 2008). Therefore, in
Study 3, we manipulated personal control over positive life
events and examined its effects on the two types of in-group
positivity. We also included a baseline condition.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants and procedure
Study 3 was conducted among 245 participants recruited
via Mechanical Turk. Participants were asked to state the
nationality they most identify with in an open-ended ques-
tion. They were randomly assigned to one of the three
experimental conditions. Personal control was manipulated
with the procedure used by Kay and colleagues (2008,
Studies 1, 2, and 4). Participants were asked to think about
and describe something positive that happened to them
over which they did or did not have control. In the baseline
condition, they were simply asked to describe something
positive that happened to them (with no mention of con-
trol). We excluded two participants who stated they cannot
recall such events. Immediately following the manipula-
tion, we included a measure of general personal control
and filler questions (based on Kay et al., 2008, Study 1),
and one item measuring self-esteem. However, there were
no significant effects of the research conditions on any of
these measures.2
Afterward, participants responded to the measures of col-
lective narcissism and in-group identification. The order of
scale presentation was counterbalanced and did not moderate
the effects. In Study 3, the two in-group positivity scales
measured American identity only, so we excluded data from
55 participants who reported their national identity as other
than American or mixed American.3 To ensure participants
were diligent in data completion, we further excluded 34 par-
ticipants with extremely short completion times, which was
determined based on average reading time at 120 seconds or
less. This was implemented because Study 3 did not include
an attention check task (no extreme times identified;
all< 16min). The final sample consisted of 154 participants
(62 women, 90 men, 2 unknown), ages 17–59 (M5 29.93,
SD5 9.11), with most (n5 119) reporting White (not His-
panic) as their ethnicity. There were 57 participants in the




In-group identification was measured as in Studies 1 and 2
(a5 .89; M5 3.28, SD5 0.73), with respect to the national
in-group (Americans).
Collective narcissism
Collective narcissism was measured as in Studies 1 and 2
(a5 .86; M5 2.36, SD5 0.99), with respect to the national
in-group (Americans).
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4.2 | Results
4.2.1 | Unadjusted analyses
Collective narcissism was positively and significantly corre-
lated with in-group identification, r(152)5 .60, p< .001.
When the effects of personal control were analyzed without
covariates, there were no statistically significant effects on
collective narcissism, F(2, 151)5 1.73, p5 .18, h2p5 .02
(low control: M5 2.41, SD5 1.01; baseline: M5 2.52,
SD5 1.06; high control: M5 2.18, SD5 0.91), nor on in-
group identification, F(2, 151)5 0.78, p5 .46, h2p5 .01
(low control: M5 3.16, SD5 0.67; baseline: M5 3.33,
SD5 0.74; high control: M5 3.32, SD5 0.77).
4.2.2 | Analyses adjusting for the other type
of in-group positivity
When we adjusted for in-group identification, we found a
significant effect of the personal control manipulation on nar-
cissistic in-group positivity, F(2, 150)5 3.56, p5 .03,
h2p5 .05 (Figure 1). We computed a planned polynomial
contrast testing for a linear trend, which represents a propor-
tionate decrease in narcissistic in-group positivity as personal
control increases; estimate5 –0.26, p5 .02. Moreover, pair-
wise comparisons indicated that narcissistic in-group positiv-
ity was significantly lower in the high-control condition
(Madj5 2.14, SE5 0.10) than in the low-control condition
(Madj5 2.51, SE5 0.12), estimate5 0.37, p5 .02, or in the
baseline condition (Madj5 2.48, SE5 0.11), estimate5 0.34,
p5 .03. The low-control condition did not differ signifi-
cantly from the baseline condition, estimate5 0.03, p5 .85.
When we adjusted for collective narcissism, we found a mar-
ginally significant effect of the personal control manipulation
on non-narcissistic in-group positivity, F(2, 150)5 2.59,
p5 .08, h2p5 .03. The linear trend was significant,
estimate5 0.19, p5 .03, indicating that there was a propor-
tionate increase in non-narcissistic in-group positivity as per-
sonal control increases. Pairwise comparisons indicated that
non-narcissistic in-group positivity was higher in the high
personal control condition (Madj5 3.40, SE5 0.08) than in
the low personal control condition (Madj5 3.14, SE5 0.09),
estimate5 0.26, p5 .03. The baseline condition
(Madj5 3.26, SE5 0.08), which fell in the middle, did not
differ significantly from the high-control condition,
estimate5 0.15, p5 .20, or the low-control condition,
estimate5 0.12, p5 .32. The pattern of results remained the
same adjusting for age, gender, ethnicity, and education.
However, when participants with short completion times
were included in the ANCOVAs, the effects were not signifi-
cant: for narcissistic in-group positivity, F(2, 179)5 2.31,
p5 .10, h2p5 .03; for non-narcissistic in-group positivity, F
(2, 179)5 1.99, p5 .14, h2p5 .02.
4.3 | Discussion
In Study 3, narcissistic in-group positivity was highest when
participants were asked to recall life events that they could not
control, whereas non-narcissistic in-group positivity was high-
est when participants recalled events they had control over.
Although these effects corroborated the results of Studies 1
and 2, the effect for narcissistic in-group positivity was only
marginally significant. It is at least plausible that the personal
control manipulation is weaker when participants are asked to
recall positive (rather than negative) events. Therefore, a
manipulation involving only positive events might have
resulted in a more conservative test for our predictions. Never-
theless, analyses of linear contrasts confirmed that participants
in the baseline condition showed moderate scores for both
measures, indicating that both an increase and a decrease in
personal control affect the two types of in-group positivity.
Importantly, pairwise comparisons showed a drop in narcissis-
tic in-group positivity in the high personal control condition
(relative to the low personal control or baseline conditions),
suggesting that increased personal control might be especially
successful in decreasing the defensive narcissistic dimension
of in-group positivity. This result is in line with research point-
ing to the beneficial effects of increased personal control for
psychological adjustment (e.g., Lachman & Weaver, 1998).
5 | STUDY 4
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that changes in personal con-












In-group idenficaon Collecve narcissism
Low control                                 Baseline High control
FIGURE 1 Mean estimates of the two types of in-group positivity
depending on the effects of control manipulation (Study 3). Because the
twomeasures used different scales, scores were standardized prior to plot-
ting. Means are adjusted for the other type of in-group positivity. Error
bars represent standard errors
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understand whether the two types of in-group positivity
affect personal control. Study 4 examined this possibility
with a longitudinal design. Recent research shows that identi-
fication with social groups increases feelings of personal
control, which further foster greater well-being (Greenaway
et al., 2015). This perspective can be integrated with our
findings by proposing that the relationship between personal
control and non-narcissistic in-group positivity might be
reciprocal. In other words, we expected personal control to
increase non-narcissistic in-group positivity and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity to increase personal control.
As in Studies 1–3, we expected low personal control to
increase narcissistic in-group positivity. However, we did not
expect narcissistic in-group positivity to increase personal
control. Even if narcissistic in-group positivity temporarily
helps manage control needs, due to its defensive and com-
pensatory nature, the control restoration associated with nar-
cissistic in-group positivity is unlikely to be satisfactory or
long-lasting. As suggested by self-determination theory,
defensive compensation of frustrated needs serves only to
further thwart these needs and tends to predict negative psy-
chological consequences in the future (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Thus, we expected a weaker or even a negative relationship
between narcissistic in-group positivity and personal control
measured a few weeks later. We tested these predictions in a
longitudinal study that measured personal control, collective
narcissism, and in-group identification twice.
We also examined whether narcissistic and non-narcissistic
in-group positivity differentially mediate the effects of personal
control on attitudes toward out-groups. Based on previous
research showing that the two types of in-group positivity have
opposite relationships with out-group attitudes (e.g., Cichocka
et al., 2015; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013),
we predicted that narcissistic in-group positivity should medi-
ate between low personal control and less favorable out-group
attitudes, whereas non-narcissistic in-group positivity should
mediate between high personal control and more favorable
out-group attitudes. The two waves of Study 4 included meas-
ures of hostile out-group intentions, allowing us to test for
longitudinal mediation effects (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). We
also considered alternative models, in which we swapped pre-
dictors, mediators, and outcomes. Although these alternative
models do not transpire from our theoretical approach, a longi-
tudinal design offers an opportunity to compare them with the
hypothesized mediation models.
5.1 | Method
5.1.1 | Participants and procedure
Study 4 was part of a larger longitudinal survey with two
waves. Participants were recruited via an Internet research
panel. The initial measurement was conducted in early May
2012 among 592 Polish adults. The second measurement
took place 6 weeks later while the UEFA European Cham-
pionship in football was taking place in Poland (after the
group stage took place and Poland had been eliminated from
the tournament). Because the championship involves compe-
tition between European national teams, it highlights national
identities and the rivalry between them (see e.g., Fritsche
et al., 2013). The second measurement recruited 398 partici-
pants, constituting our final sample, which included 201
women and 197 men, ages 15–73 (M5 32.05, SD5 12.33).
All participants reported being Polish.
5.1.2 | Measures
In-group identification
In-group identification was measured as in Studies 1–3, with
respect to Poles as the national group (T1: a5 .87,
M5 3.40, SD5 0.71; T2: a5 .87, M5 3.33, SD5 0.65).
Collective narcissism
Collective narcissism was measured with the nine-item ver-
sion of the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala
et al., 2009). Participants indicated how much they agree
with the items in relation to Poles as their national group
using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree; T1: a5 .84, M5 4.33, SD5 1.05; T2:
a5 .85, M5 4.21, SD5 0.94).
Personal control
Personal control was measured with items 1–3 used in Study
1 (T1: a5 .80, M5 4.20, SD5 1.38; T2: a5 .80, M5 4.08,
SD5 1.32).
Out-group hostility
Participants were asked to what extent they would like to
engage in hostile behaviors (e.g., fighting, confronting, or
avoiding; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) toward six Euro-
pean nationalities—Czechs, French, Germans, Greeks, Rus-
sians, and Slovaks—on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely no)
to 7 (definitely yes). We averaged scores for all groups to cre-
ate an index of out-group hostility (T1: a5 .96, M5 3.19,
SD5 1.06; T2: a5 .97, M5 3.24, SD5 1.08).
4
5.2 | Results
5.2.1 | Unadjusted analyses
Zero-order correlations are presented in Table 1. Personal
control was positively correlated with in-group identification
at Time 1 and Time 2. However, contrary to our expecta-
tions, personal control was also positively (although not
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significantly) correlated with collective narcissism at Time 1
and significantly positively correlated with collective narcis-
sism at Time 2. Furthermore, in-group identification was
negatively correlated with out-group hostility, although this
effect was only significant at Time 2. Collective narcissism
was positively correlated with out-group hostility at both
Times 1 and 2.
5.2.2 | Analyses adjusting for the other type
of in-group positivity
In order to examine the effects of personal control on narcis-
sistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity, and intergroup
intentions over time, we estimated a cross-lagged latent vari-
ables model. The model was run in Mplus7 (Muthen &
Muthen, 1998–2012), with the use of the maximum likeli-
hood estimates of model parameters. To maintain an
adequate ratio of cases to parameters and to smooth measure-
ment error, we used parceling (Little, Cunningham, Shahar,
& Widaman, 2002). For collective narcissism, we created
three parcels at random (the same parcels were used at Times
1 and 2). For in-group identification, we used three parcels
based on the three subscales of the scale. For out-group hos-
tility, we created six parcels corresponding to each of the
national groups. For personal control, we used the three
items as indicators. The first factor loading of each latent
variable was set to unity, and residual errors of correspond-
ing indicators were allowed to correlate over time in all sub-
sequent analyses.
We first tested a longitudinal measurement model with
freely estimated parameters, in which all Time 1 latent varia-
bles predicted all Time 2 latent variables. The model showed
satisfactory fit, v2(362)5 914.70, p< .001, CFI5 .97,
RMSEA5 .06, SRMR5 .06. To ensure that the same attrib-
utes were being measured at the two time points, we com-
pared this model with a metric invariance model, in which
factor loadings of corresponding indicators across time were
constrained to be invariant (e.g., Little, Preacher, Selig, &
Card, 2007). This model did not fit worse than the less
restrictive measurement model, v2(373)5 925.56, p< .001,
CFI5 .92, RMSEA5 .06, SRMR5 .06, Dv2(11)5 10.86,
p5 .45, indicating sufficient metric invariance for testing a
latent longitudinal model.
Path coefficients of the metric invariant model are pre-
sented in Figure 2. In line with the hypotheses, the path from
Time 1 personal control to Time 2 narcissistic in-group posi-
tivity was negative and significant (B5 –0.05, SE5 0.02,
b5 –.10, p5 .045), whereas the path from Time 1 narcissis-
tic in-group positivity to Time 2 personal control was nega-
tive and nonsignificant (B5 –0.13, SE5 0.13, b5 –.07,
p5 .30). Both paths between control and non-narcissistic in-
group positivity were positive and significant: Time 1 perso-
nal control predicted Time 2 non-narcissistic in-group posi-
tivity (B5 0.06, SE5 0.02, b5 .16, p5 .001), and Time 1
non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicted Time 2 perso-
nal control (B5 0.42, SE5 0.15, b5 .19, p5 .01). Further-
more, the path from Time 1 out-group hostility to Time 2
narcissistic in-group positivity was not significant (B5 0.05,
SE5 0.03, b5 .08, p5 .10), but the path from Time 1 nar-
cissistic in-group positivity to Time 2 out-group hostility was
positive and significant (B5 0.29, SE5 0.10, b5 .18,
p5 .004). The path from Time 1 out-group hostility to Time
2 non-narcissistic in-group positivity was not significant
(B5 0.01, SE5 0.03, b5 .02, p5 .74), but the path from
Time 1 non-narcissistic in-group positivity to Time 2 out-
group hostility was negative and significant (B5 –0.31,
SE5 0.12, b5 –.17, p5 .01). Thus, in line with the predic-
tions, both Time 1 narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group
positivity differentially predicted Time 2 out-group hostility,
yet Time 1 out-group hostility did not predict Time 2 narcis-
sistic or non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Finally, neither
the path from Time 1 personal control to Time 2 out-group
TABLE 1 Correlations among Study 4 variables
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. T1 Personal control –
2. T2 Personal control .51*** –
3. T1 In-group identification .17*** .23*** –
4. T2 In-group identification .25*** .28*** .64*** –
5. T1 Collective narcissism .05 .05 .44*** .35*** –
6. T2 Collective narcissism –.03 .11* .36*** .43*** .59*** 2
7. T1 Out-group hostility 2.09
1 2.13* 2.06 2.04 .16*** .17*** 2
8. T2 Out-group hostility 2.09
1 2.10* 2.091 2.17*** .15** .15** .49***
Note. 1p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01.***p< .001.
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hostility (B5 –0.02, SE5 0.04, b5 –.03, p5 .60) nor the
path from Time 1 out-group hostility to Time 2 personal con-
trol (B5 –0.09, SE5 0.07, b5 –.07, p5 .20) were signifi-
cant. The significance of the paths did not change when we
added gender, age, and education as covariates in Time 1.
We then proceeded to examine whether the two types of
in-group positivity mediated the effect of personal control on
out-group hostility. This can be achieved by testing indirect
effects in which the paths from the predictors measured in
Time 1 to the mediators measured in Time 2 are multiplied
by the paths from the mediators measured in Time 1 to the
outcomes measured in Time 2 (see Cole & Maxwell, 2003;
Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014; Little et al., 2007). To
generate bias-corrected confidence intervals for the indirect
effects, we used bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples. We
first tested the indirect effect of Time 1 personal control on
Time 2 narcissistic in-group positivity multiplied by Time 1
narcissistic in-group positivity on Time 2 out-group hostility.
This indirect effect was marginally significant, estimate5
–0.01, 95% CI [–0.04, 0.00], 90% CI [–0.04, –0.002]. Sec-
ond, we tested the indirect effect of Time 1 personal control
on Time 2 non-narcissistic in-group positivity multiplied by
Time 1 non-narcissistic in-group positivity on Time 2
out-group hostility. The indirect effect was significant,
estimate5 –0.02, 95% CI [–0.05, –0.004].
We also examined alternative mediation models of (a)
personal control on the two types of in-group positivity via
out-group hostility, (b) the two types of in-group positivity on
out-group hostility via personal control, (c) out-group hostil-
ity on the two types of in-group positivity via personal con-
trol, and (d) out-group hostility on personal control via the
two types of in-group positivity. None of these indirect
effects were significant (all 90% and 95% CIs included zeros).
Overall, the data were most consistent with the hypothesized
pattern of results in which personal control predicts out-group










































T2  Personal 
control
FIGURE 2 Cross-laggedmodel testing the longitudinal relationships between personal control, the two types of in-group positivity, and out-group
hostility (Study 4). Entries are standardized coefficients. Broken lines represent nonsignificant paths. The error term for each indicator at Time 1 was
allowed to correlate with the error term for the same indicator at Time 2.1p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001
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demographics were included as covariates in the indirect
effects model, results were very similar, although in this case
the indirect effect of personal control on out-group hostility
via narcissistic in-group positivity became significant,
estimate5 –0.01, 95% CI [–0.05, –0.001].
5.3 | Discussion
Study 4 supported our hypothesis that low personal control
measured at Time 1 would predict narcissistic in-group posi-
tivity at Time 2. It also showed that Time 1 narcissistic in-
group positivity did not significantly predict personal control
measured at Time 2. This pattern of results suggests that any
immediate control compensation provided by narcissistic in-
group positivity is not long-lasting. Conversely, for non-
narcissistic in-group positivity, both paths were significant:
High personal control at Time 1 predicted greater non-
narcissistic in-group positivity at Time 2, and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity at Time 1 predicted greater
personal control at Time 2. These results suggest that perso-
nal control reinforces non-narcissistic in-group positivity a
few weeks later, and, at the same time, non-narcissistic in-
group positivity reinforces feelings of personal control. This
supports the assumption that in-group identification devoid
of the narcissistic component is a more secure form of in-
group positivity.
In line with previous findings from cross-sectional stud-
ies (e.g., Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013),
Time 1 narcissistic in-group positivity was a positive predic-
tor of Time 2 out-group hostility, whereas Time 1 non-
narcissistic in-group positivity was a negative predictor of
Time 2 out-group hostility. We did not, however, find evi-
dence for the opposite relationship: Time 1 out-group hostil-
ity had weaker (and nonsignificant) effects on Time 2
in-group positivity. Furthermore, the effects of Time 1 perso-
nal control on Time 2 out-group hostility were differentially
driven by the two forms of in-group positivity, although the
indirect effect via narcissistic in-group positivity was gener-
ally weak and only marginally significant.
6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this research program was to examine the links
between the basic human need for personal control and in-
group positivity. Across four studies, we hypothesized and
found that both threats and boosts to personal control can
increase in-group positivity, but in-group positivity of a dif-
ferent kind. Low personal control was linked to narcissistic
in-group positivity, which captures a concern about the exter-
nal recognition of the in-group’s worth, whereas high perso-
nal control was linked to non-narcissistic in-group positivity
—a positive investment in the in-group that is independent
of the recognition of the group by others. These effects were
especially pronounced when we accounted for the variance
shared between collective narcissism and in-group
identification.
Both self-reported and experimentally manipulated feel-
ings of low personal control predicted stronger narcissistic
in-group positivity. We argue that if narcissistic in-group
positivity stems from a frustration of the need for control,
then it serves a compensatory function of managing the indi-
vidual self. This confirms previous claims about the defen-
sive nature of narcissistic in-group positivity (Golec de
Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-
Golec, 2013). Study 4 demonstrated that even if increased
narcissistic in-group positivity may be functional in tempo-
rarily restoring personal control, this effect is not long-
lasting. Narcissistic in-group positivity was not significantly
associated with feelings of control measured 6 weeks later.
Taken together, these findings point to the conclusion that
narcissistic in-group positivity serves as a momentary, and
potentially maladaptive, compensation for decreased perso-
nal control. By elucidating the underpinnings and functions
of narcissistic in-group positivity, the current studies extend
previous research on collective narcissism, which largely
focused on its consequences.
At the same time, we found that increased feelings of
personal control foster in-group identification without the
narcissistic component. Both self-reported and experimen-
tally induced feelings of personal control predicted increased
non-narcissistic in-group positivity. It seems that because
non-narcissistic in-group positivity stems from feelings of
high control, it can serve as a genuine expression of commu-
nal concerns. In fact, personal control and non-narcissistic
in-group positivity appear to be mutually reinforcing. In
Study 4, non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicted
increased feelings of personal control several weeks later.
Thus, the current studies also add to our understanding of
non-narcissistic in-group positivity by demonstrating that it
is non-compensatory and potentially secure and adaptive.
We expect that such in-group positivity would have positive
consequences for personal well-being (Greenaway et al.,
2015).
Our findings corroborate and extend previous research
on the role of control motivation in shaping in-group favorit-
ism. In previous research, lack of control predicted in-group
support and defense (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010, 2013; Fritsche
et al., 2008, 2013) but rarely directly affected the strength of
in-group positivity (cf. Fritsche et al., 2008; Stollberg et al.,
2015). Although several previous studies evaluated effects of
personal control on connectedness to the in-group and impor-
tance of the in-group to the self (which are akin to our opera-
tionalization of in-group identification), personal control
manipulations did not have significant effects on those
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measures (Fritsche et al., 2008, 2013). One possible reason
for these null effects was that these studies did not distin-
guish between narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group posi-
tivity. By considering the two types of in-group positivity,
we were able to demonstrate that they have opposite relation-
ships with personal control.
In the current research, we covaried out defensiveness
associated with collective narcissism to reveal the effects of
non-narcissistic in-group positivity. In doing so, we followed
an established tradition of capturing security by covarying
out defensiveness (e.g., in the case of self-esteem; see
Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016; Locke,
2009; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Paulhus et al., 2004).
Similarly, we used partialing to demonstrate the effects of
narcissistic in-group positivity, without the variance shared
with in-group identification. Such a strategy should be imple-
mented only under certain conditions (Lynam, Hoyle, &
Newman, 2006). Following recommendations of Lynam and
colleagues (2006), we ensured these conditions were met by
partialing reliable and relatively homogenous measures that
showed only moderate intercorrelations and confirming the
effects with structural equation modeling (Study 4). We also
clarified the theoretical mechanism underlying the partial
effects. Using partialing has an important advantage: It
allows researchers to measure different forms of in-group
positivity indirectly, with a lower likelihood of responses
being affected by participants’ impression management con-
cerns. This approach is easily implemented and, if used cau-
tiously, might be more reliable than other indirect methods,
including implicit ones. These advantages notwithstanding,
partialing makes the current effects more difficult to interpret
or to apply in real life. For example, the findings do not eas-
ily translate to individual cases, as narcissistic and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity might often coexist (see
Stoeber, Kobori, & Brown, 2014, for a discussion of similar
effects in the context of perfectionism). Therefore, in the
future it would be useful to develop tools that capture narcis-
sistic and non-narcissistic in-group positivity more directly,
without the need to covary out the variance shared between
these two constructs.
The current findings are important for understanding the
foundations of in-group positivity, and its consequences for
intergroup attitudes. Previous studies found that lack of con-
trol increases in-group bias and negative out-group attitudes
(Agroskin & Jonas, 2010, 2013; Aydin et al., 2014; Fritsche
et al., 2008, 2013; Greenaway et al., 2014), which are
robustly predicted by collective narcissism. Non-narcissistic
in-group positivity, on the other hand, is more likely to foster
tolerance and openness to other groups (Golec de Zavala,
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). As demonstrated in Study 4,
the two forms of in-group positivity can serve to further
explain the link between personal control and out-group
hostility. Indeed, non-narcissistic in-group positivity medi-
ated the link between increased control and out-group toler-
ance, whereas narcissistic in-group positivity mediated the
relationship between lack of control and out-group hostility
(although the latter effect was only marginally significant).
Future research should elucidate the consequences of perso-
nal control for other intragroup and intergroup outcomes.
Our hypotheses were supported in two countries: Poland
and the United States. To facilitate the comparability of our
findings, in all studies we focused only on national in-group
positivity. Previously, narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-
group positivity have also been studied in the context of
other social categories, such as college peers (e.g., Golec de
Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Golec de Zavala,
Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013). Effects of control motiva-
tion on other social identities await future empirical examina-
tion. Future studies would also do well to test other
motivational factors as predictors of narcissistic and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity. It is at least plausible that par-
allel findings would be observed for existential, epistemic, or
relational motives. Presumably, turning to the in-group could
compensate for threats to a variety of human needs. Because
this mechanism is compensatory, it is more likely to foster
defensive narcissistic in-group positivity. This would be in
line with Fromm’s (1973) and Adorno’s (1963/1998) claims
that collective narcissism covers a weak and threatened ego.
At the same time, we suspect that satisfaction of epistemic or
relational needs might not be as efficient in promoting non-
narcissistic in-group positivity. As argued by self-
determination theory, feelings of control and autonomy are
essential for optimal psychological outcomes (Deci & Ryan,
2000). Therefore, satisfaction of the fundamental human
motivation for control might be crucial for shaping secure
investment of the self in social groups, which might help fos-
ter more inclusive social identities. In times when Western
countries are facing a refugee and immigration crisis, under-
standing ways in which we can achieve this seems more
pressing than ever.
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NOTES
1 Personal control can be differentiated from certainty (people can be
certain about their future, and at the same time feel that they do not
control their fate; Fritsche et al., 2013) or power (which additionally
presumes the capacity to influence other people; Keltner, Gruenfeld, &
Anderson, 2003).
2 One possible explanation for the nonsignificant effects is that a
decrease in control might not manifest itself in explicit reports of con-
trol taken immediately after the manipulation, due to the defensive
tendency to first show passive avoidance of motivationally relevant
discrepancies (including those between the available vs. desired perso-
nal control; see Jonas et al., 2014).
3 Two participants were excluded despite reporting American nationality
because they expressed doubts about it in the comments (one said he
or she identified more with a different nationality, and another ques-
tioned the use of the term American to refer to U.S. identity).
4 Positive out-group intentions (e.g., helping) were also measured as fil-
ler items. When we added positive intentions as indices of latent out-
group intentions, the effects were similar to those obtained for hostile
intentions only, but the model fit was poor, for the measurement model
v2(770)5 3256.73, p< .001, CFI5 .73, RMSEA5 .09, SRMR5 .11.
The survey also included a measure of emotions toward out-groups
(e.g., admiration-disgust), but we did not find similar effects for this
variable: Time 1 out-group emotions did not significantly predict Time
2 control or the two types of in-group positivity, and Time 1 control
and the two types of in-group positivity did not significantly predict
Time 2 out-group emotions.
REFERENCES
Adorno, T. (1998). Critical models: Interventions and catchwords.
New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work pub-
lished 1963)
Agroskin, D., & Jonas, E. (2010). Out of control: How and why does
perceived lack of control lead to ethnocentrism? Review of Psy-
chology, 17, 79–90.
Agroskin, D., & Jonas, E. (2013). Controlling death by defending
ingroups—Mediational insights into terror management and con-
trol restoration. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49,
1144–1158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.014
Amiot, C. E., & Aubin, R. M. (2013). Why and how are you
attached to your social group? Investigating different forms of
social identification. British Journal of Social Psychology, 52,
563–586. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12004
Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An
organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation and sig-
nificance of multidimensionality. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 80–
114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.1.80
Aydin, N., Krueger, J. I., Frey, D., Kastenm€ueller, A., & Fischer, P.
(2014). Social exclusion and xenophobia: Intolerant attitudes
toward ethnic and religious minorities. Group Processes & Inter-
group Relations, 17, 371–387. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1368430213510569
Balcerczyk, I. (2014). The subjective model of the civil society in
terms of Pope John Paul II. In A. Jarosz (Ed.), Good governance
and civil society: Selected issues on the relations between state,
economy and society (pp. 115–130). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK:
Cambridge Scholars.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong:
Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human
motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497–529. https://doi.org/
10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497
Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a united Ger-
many: Nationalism or patriotism? An empirical test with represen-
tative data. Political Psychology, 24, 289–312. https://doi.org/10.
1111/0162-895X.00329
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or
outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55, 429–444. https://doi.
org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126
Cai, H., & Gries, P. (2013). National narcissism: Internal dimensions
and international correlates. PsyCh Journal, 2, 122–132. https://
doi.org/10.1002/pchj.26
Cameron, J. E. (2004). A three-factor model of social identity. Self
and Identity, 3, 239–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/13576500444
000047
Cichocka, A., Golec de Zavala, A., Marchlewska, M., & Olechowski,
M. (2015). Grandiose delusions: Collective narcissism, secure in-
group identification and belief in conspiracies. In M. Bilewicz, A.
Cichocka, & W. Soral (Eds.), The psychology of conspiracy (pp.
42–61). London, UK: Routledge.
Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., & Golec de Zavala, A. (2016). Does
self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs? Narcissism, self-
esteem and the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Social Psy-
chological and Personality Science, 7, 157–166. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1948550615616170
Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., Golec de Zavala, A., & Olechowski,
M. (2016). “They will not control us”: In-group positivity and
belief in intergroup conspiracies. British Journal of Psychology,
107, 556–576. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12158
Cole, D. A., & Maxwell, S. E. (2003). Testing mediational models
with longitudinal data: Questions and tips in the use of structural
equation modeling. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 558–
577. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.112.4.558
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1987). The support of autonomy and the
control of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 53, 1024–1037. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.6.1024
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal
pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior.
Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268. https://doi.org/10.1207/
S15327965PLI1104_01
478 | CICHOCKA ET AL.
De Figueiredo, R. J., & Elkins, Z. (2003). Are patriots bigots? An
inquiry into the vices of in-group pride. American Journal of Polit-
ical Science, 47, 171–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00012
Dhont, K., Van Hiel, A., & Hewstone, M. (2014). Changing the ideo-
logical roots of prejudice: Longitudinal effects of ethnic inter-
group contact on social dominance orientation. Group Processes
& Intergroup Relations, 17, 27–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1368430213497064
Druckman, D. (1994). Nationalism, patriotism, and group loyalty: A
social psychological perspective. Mershon International Studies
Review, 38, 43–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/222610
Emmons, R. A. (1987). Narcissism: Theory and measurement. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 11–17. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.11
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York, NY:
Norton.
Frey, D., & Rez, H. (2002). Population and predators: Precondition
for the Holocaust from a control-theoretical perspective. In L. S.
Newman & R. Erber (Eds.), Understanding genocide (pp. 188–
221). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Fritsche, I., Jonas, E., Ablasser, C., Beyer, M., Kuban, J., Manger,
A., & Schultz, M. (2013). The power of we: Evidence for group-
based control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49,
19–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.07.014
Fritsche, I., Jonas, E., & Fankhänel, T. (2008). The role of control
motivation in mortality salience effects on ingroup support and
defense. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 524–
541. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012666
Fromm, E. (1973). The anatomy of human destructiveness. London,
UK: Pimlico.
Gagne, M. (2003). The role of autonomy support and autonomy ori-
entation in prosocial behavior engagement. Motivation and Emo-
tion, 27, 199–223. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025007614869
Gagne, M., & Deci, E. L. (2005). Self-determination theory and work
motivation. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 331–362.
https://doi.org/10.1002/job.322
Golec de Zavala, A., & Cichocka, A. (2012). Collective narcissism and
anti-Semitism in Poland. Group Processes and Intergroup Rela-
tions, 15, 213–229. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430211420891
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., & Bilewicz, M. (2013). The para-
dox of in-group love: Differentiating collective narcissism advan-
ces understanding of the relationship between in-group and out-
group attitudes. Journal of Personality, 81, 16–28. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00779.x
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N.
(2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 1074–1096. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0016904
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., & Iskra-Golec, I. (2013). Collec-
tive narcissism moderates the effect of in-group image threat on
intergroup hostility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 104, 1019–1039. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032215
Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Orehek, E., & Abdollahi, A.
(2012). Intrinsic religiosity reduces intergroup hostility under mor-
tality salience. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 451–
461. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1843
Greenaway, K. H., Haslam, S. A., Cruwys, T., Branscombe, N. R.,
Ysseldyk, R., & Heldreth, C. (2015). From “we” to “me”: Group
identification enhances perceived personal control with conse-
quences for health and well-being. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 109, 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
pspi0000019
Greenaway, K. H., Louis, W. R., Hornsey, M. J., & Jones, J. M.
(2014). Perceived control qualifies the effects of threat on preju-
dice. British Journal of Social Psychology, 53, 422–442. https://
doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12049
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M.
(1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related
thoughts in mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 67, 627–637. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.67.4.627
Jackson, J. W., & Smith, E. R. (1999). Conceptualizing social iden-
tity: A new framework and evidence for the impact of different
dimensions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 120–
135. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025001010
Jans, L., Postmes, T., & Van der Zee, K. I. (2012). Sharing differen-
ces: The inductive route to social identity formation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 1145–1149. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.013
Jonas, E., McGregor, I., Klackl, J., Agroskin, D., Fritsche, I., Hol-
brook, C., . . . Quirin, M. (2014). Threat and defense: From anxi-
ety to approach. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 49, pp. 219–286). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K.
(2008). God and the government: Testing a compensatory control
mechanism for the support of external systems. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 95, 18–35. https://doi.org/10.
1037/0022-3514.95.1.18
Kay, A. C., Whitson, J. A., Gaucher, D., & Galinsky, A. D (2009).
Compensatory control: Achieving order through the mind, our
institutions, and the heavens. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 18, 264–268. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.
01649.x
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power,
approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110, 265–284.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265
Kernis, M. H. (2005). Measuring self-esteem in context: The impor-
tance of stability of self-esteem in psychological functioning.
Journal of Personality, 73, 1569–1605. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-6494.2005.00359.x
Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1997). “. . . and besides, I
probably couldn’t have made a difference anyway”: Justification
of social dilemma defection via perceived self-inefficacy. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 211–230. https://doi.org/
10.1006/jesp.1996.1319
Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic
and nationalistic attitudes. Political Psychology, 10, 257–274.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3791647
Lachman, M. E., & Weaver, S. L. (1998). The sense of control as a
moderator of social class differences in health and well-being.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 763–773.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.763
CICHOCKA ET AL. | 479
Leach, C. W., Van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L., Penne-
kamp, S. F., Doosje, B., . . . Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-
definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent)
model of in-group identification. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 95, 144–165. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.95.1.144
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F.
(2002) To parcel or not to parcel: Exploring the question and
weighing the merits. Structural Equation Modeling, 9, 151–173.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM0902_1
Little, T. D., Preacher, K. J., Selig, J. P., & Card, N. A. (2007). New
developments in latent variable panel analyses of longitudinal
data. Journal of Behavioral Development, 31, 357–365. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0165025407077757
Locke, K. D. (2009). Aggression, narcissism, self-esteem, and the
attribution of desirable and humanizing traits to self versus others.
Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 99–102. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jrp.2008.10.003
Lynam, D. R., Hoyle, R. H., & Newman, J. P. (2006). The perils of par-
tialling: Cautionary tales from aggression and psychopathy. Assess-
ment, 13, 328–341. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191106290562
Lyons, P. A., Coursey, L. E., & Kenworthy, J. B. (2013). National
identity and group narcissism as predictors of intergroup attitudes
toward undocumented Latino immigrants in the United States.
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 35, 323–335. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0739986313488090
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emo-
tions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup con-
text. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 602–616.
https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.79.4.602
Marchlewska, M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). An autobiographical gate-
way: Narcissists avoid first-person visual perspective while
retrieving self-threatening memories. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 68, 157–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.
2016.06.003
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of nar-
cissism: A dynamic self-regulatory processing model. Psychological
Inquiry, 12, 177–196. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1204_1
Mullin, B. A., & Hogg, M. A. (1998). Dimensions of subjective
uncertainty in social identification and minimal intergroup dis-
crimination. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 345–365.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1998.tb01176.x
Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Nationalism and
patriotism: National identification and out-group rejection. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 159–172. https://doi.org/10.
1348/014466601164740
Muthen, L. K., & Muthen, B. O. (1998–2012). Mplus user’s guide
(7th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthen and Muthen.
Paulhus, D. L., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Tracy, J. L.
(2004). Two replicable suppressor situations in personality
research. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 303–328. https://
doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_7
Postmes, T., Haslam, S. A., & Jans, L. (2012). A single-item measure
of social identification: Reliability, validity, and utility. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 52, 597–617. https://doi.org/10.
1111/bjso.12006
Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-
based guilt: Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence,
and reactions to the in-group’s moral violations. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 91, 698–711. https://doi.org/10.
1037/0022-3514.91.4.698
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human poten-
tials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 141–166. https://doi.org/
10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.141
Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of
national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism. Political
Psychology, 20, 151–174. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00140
Skinner, E. A. (1996). A guide to constructs of control. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 549–570. https://doi.org/
10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.549
Stoeber, J., Kobori, O., & Brown, A. (2014). Examining mutual sup-
pression effects in the assessment of perfectionism cognitions:
Evidence supporting multidimensional assessment. Assessment,
21, 647–660. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191114534884
Stollberg, J., Fritsche, I., & Bäcker, A. (2015). Striving for group
agency: Threat to personal control increases the attractiveness of
agentic groups. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 649. https://doi.org/
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00649
Stronge, S., Cichocka, A., & Sibley, C. (2016). Narcissistic self-
esteem or optimal self-esteem? A latent-profile analysis of self-
esteem and psychological entitlement. Journal of Research in
Personality, 63, 102–110. https://doi.org/0.1016/j.jrp.2016.06.016
Tajfel, H. E. (1978). Differentiation between social groups: Studies in
the social psychology of intergroup relations. London: Academic
Press.
Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theory of
cognitive adaptation. American Psychologist, 38, 1161–1173.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.38.11.1161
Van Veelen, R., Otten, S., & Hansen, N. (2011). Linking self and
ingroup: Self-anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social
identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 628–
637. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.792
Vignoles, V. L., Regalia, C., Manzi, C., Golledge, J., & Scabini, E.
(2006). Beyond self-esteem: Influence of multiple motives on
identity construction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 90, 308–333. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.308
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases
illusory pattern perception. Science, 322, 115–117. https://doi.org/
10.1126/science.1159845
Yampolsky, M. A., & Amiot, C. E. (2013). Priming self-determined
and non-self-determined group identification: Effects on well-
being and ingroup bias. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and
Practice, 17, 137–149. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032825
How to cite this article: Cichocka A, Golec de Zavala
A, Marchlewska M, Bilewicz M, Jaworska M, Ole-
chowski M. Personal control decreases narcissistic but
increases non-narcissistic in-group positivity. J Pers.
2018;86:465–480. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12328
480 | CICHOCKA ET AL.
